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In  this  paper  a  dynamic  panel  data  specification  is  used  to  assess  the  relationship  between  labour  market 
flexibility  and  innovation  activities  by  distinguishing  different  technological  regimes  of  activities  and 
geographical areas of the Italian economy. In order to estimate the previous relationship, regional patents are 
included as a proxy of the innovation, while job turnover and wages represent labour market indicators. The 
results show that higher job turnover has a significant and negative impact on patent activities only in regional 
sectors of Northern Italy,  while a positive and significant impact of blue and  white collar  wages  has been 
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1.  Introduction 
In the last decades, new approaches have accompanied the classical “compensation literature” 
in analysing the relationships between innovation and the labour market (Vivarelli and Pianta, 
2000; Aghion and Howitt, 1994; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). In particular, the Skill-
Biased Technological Changes theory (SBTC) has focused on the impact of innovations on 
the  wages  and  skills  of  the  workforce  (Bound  and  Johnson,  1992;  Berman  et  al.,  1994; 
Johnson, 1997, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Mincer, 2003). Theoretical and empirical 
results have dealt with the magnitude of the shift of the relative demand for skilled labour, 
yielding a new equilibrium characterized by a higher relative wage and a higher share of 
skilled employment. According to this view, the wage inequality and the need to relax the 
firing and hiring restrictions in the labour market, have been seen as a direct consequence of 
higher innovation activities. 
In the same field of studies, other authors have stressed the importance of complementarity 
between investments in innovation activities and the demand for skilled labour (Machin and 
Van Reenen, 1998; Acemoglu, 2002). If an endogenous character is recognized within this 
relationship, the importance of labour market regulation emerges in shaping the level and the 
growth  rate  of  innovation  activity  (Acemoglu,  1997a).  This  means  that  labour  market 
flexibility is conditioned by the innovation rate, but at the same time it can affect human 
capital investments, other than on the job training and learning by doing processes, causing 
feedback on innovative abilities (Acemoglu, 1997b). 
On the other hand, qualitative surveys on innovations of regional economic systems have 
shown  the  importance  of  the  labour  market  in  performing  innovation  (Storper  and  Scott, 
1995). According to these studies, labour market regulation affects the diffusion of knowledge 
and its mode of accumulation in the local production systems.  
Moreover, some econometric analyses have explored the impact of labour market regulation 
on innovation, even though they do not take into account the likely endogeneity. For example   3 
Bassanini and Ernst (2002) carried out a comparative survey among OECD countries, where 
the impact of product and labour market regulations on innovation is highlighted. Michie and 
Sheehan (2003), using a survey of UK firms, explicitly investigated firms’ use of various 
flexible  work  practices  and  the  innovative  activities  of  those  firms,  within  the  various 
industrial relation systems. 
Starting from these insights, the present paper aims to analyse if labour market flexibility 
indicators, represented by labour mobility and wages, influenced the innovation activities of 
Italian industries in the 1990-1996 period. In doing so, we attempted to take a step forward 
with respect to other empirical surveys. Firstly, a Dynamic Panel Data specification is used to 
include persistent behaviours in innovation, since the process is characterised by cumulative 
effects.  Moreover,  this  econometric  specification  allows  us  to  correct  for  likely  spurious 
innovation-labour market relationships because many empirical works have shown that labour 
indicators are not strictly exogenous
1. Secondly, to obtain a clear picture in shaping the link 
between  innovation  and  the  labour  market,  we  have  estimated  a  core  framework  and 
successfully  extended  econometric  estimations  and  tests  including  different  technological 
regimes (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997; 1996) and regional development patterns (Cooke et 
al.,1997). 
It is worth noting that the Italian economic debate around labour market has been particularly 
animated in recent years. Its lack of flexibility has often been identified as the determinant of 
a  pathological  unemployment  rate  which  has  been  recognized  as  hindering,  in  advance, 
investments in innovations. In spite of the abundance of literature dealing with the nexus of 
the first point, we think that the second point has not been explored enough. For this reason 
the  final  purpose  of  our  study  is  twofold:  through  clarifying  some  aspects  of  the  labour 
market-innovation relationship in the Italian case, we wish to contribute to an overall updating 
of the method of empirical analysis applied to this topic.   4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the conceptual 
framework supporting the empirical analysis. Section 3 focuses on the variables implemented 
in the econometric model and presents some descriptive statistics. Details on the econometric 
specifications and a brief discussion on the Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data estimator are 
reported in section 4. Finally, in section 5 the estimated results are discussed, while final 
considerations are drawn in section 6. 
 
2.  The conceptual framework of empirical analysis 
 
From  a  theoretical  point  of  view  the  relationship  between  labour  market  flexibility  and 
innovation has been mainly treated in the context of Labour Turnover (Stiglitz, 1974; Arnott 
and Stiglitz, 1985; Arnott et al., 1988) and Job-Search theories (Mortensen and Pissarides, 
1997;  1999)  aiming  to  analyse  the  unemployment  variability  as  the  result  of  imbalances 
between flows into and out of the job market. It is necessary to remark that in the Labour 
Turnover  context  innovation  is  only  tacitly  considered  while  the  focus  is  on  the  labour 
mobility-wage structure. A low wage causes a costly high mobility of labour that, in turn, 
negatively affects labour costs, productivity and human capital accumulation of workers. On 
the other hand, if efficiency-wage considerations emerge to solve this problem and labour 
market rules make layoffs prohibitively expensive, labour mobility decreases in the short term 
but rises in the long term. Firms cannot lay workers off,  go bankrupt and an increase in 
unemployment level occurs. 
 In  Job-Search  theories,  the  labour  market-innovation  relationship  is  explicitly  explained. 
According to these theories, job security reduces job destruction. The incentive to create new 
jobs in response to the need for changing products and production processes is reduced. For 
this reason too restrictive market rules inhibit an efficient reallocation of labour and hinder 
innovation activities.   5 
An  interesting  extension  of  the  Job-Search  models  is  carried  out  by  Acemoglu  (1997a; 
1997b). According to this author, when complementarities between skills of workforce and 
technology  choice  are  taken  into  account  (i.e.  an  economy  with  endogenous  technology 
choice),  a  deregulated  labour  market  is  no  longer  the  best  solution.  If  the  turnover  rate 
increases,  the  firm  does  not  invest  in  new  technology  (or  R&D)  and  on-job  training  for 
workers,  because  the  additional  return  on  training,  or  gains  stemming  from  acquired 
knowledge in R&D activities will benefit the worker who will probably soon leave the firm. 
On the other hand, if workers do not expect firms to invest in new technology (or R&D), their 
wages cannot be adequately high and they do not invest in human capital accumulation. Thus, 
life-time  employment  relationships  are  important  factors  contributing  to  technological 
changes. 
The  wage  level  can  play  an  important  role  to  stimulate  innovation  as  a  result  of  the 
performance of innovative and highly profitable firms. But it is not difficult to consider the 
equally important reverse direction of the causality. When wages are kept above their market-
clearing level, regulative interventions (minimum wages, union power, normative traditions) 
and  efficiency  are  involved  (Shapiro  and  Stiglitz,  1984;  Stiglitz  and  Greenwald,  1995). 
Efficiency wages exert a direct and positive effect on the active participation of the workforce 
in the learning process, enhancing loyalty and commitment, and stimulate practitioners into 
developing informal relationships, sharing information and accelerating the emergence of tacit 
knowledge (Antonelli, 1999; Kitson et al., 2000).  
As mentioned above, efficiency wages also exert a strong influence on labour mobility (lower 
wages stimulate skilled worker to change job), but, they very often involve unemployment 
(Stiglitz and Greenwald, 1995). 
Empirical works have found that the impact of labour market regulation on innovation is not 
well defined and univocal, but rather shows different outcomes and reveals a strong context-
dependent influence (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002; Michie and Sheehan, 2003). If we choose   6 
labour mobility and wage levels as proxies of labour market regulation
2, we can not neglect 
that these variables contribute to shaping the multidimensional character of labour flexibility.  
Indeed, Michie and Sheehan (2003) report a numerical flexibility, which is the ability of firms 
to change the number of people they employ. Functional flexibility is the ability to vary the 
amount  of  labour  that  firms  use,  without  resorting  to  the  external  labour  market.  Wage 
flexibility is the ability of pay and payment systems to respond to labour market conditions 
and to reward and encourage improved performance. 
In  our  view,  these  forms  of  labour  flexibility  could  affect  innovation  performance  of 
industries in different ways, depending on the one hand on their specific technological regime 
and on the other on the particular regional system of innovation. 
Relying  on  various  empirical  works,  Malerba  and  Orsenigo  (1997;  1996)  defined  the 
technological  regime  of  an  industry  as  a  combination  of  technological  opportunities, 
appropriability conditions, knowledge accumulation characteristics and base knowledge. The 
analysis  of  the  organization  of  innovative  activities  led  the  same  authors  to  identify  the 
classical  Schumpeterian  sectoral  patterns  by  means  of  four  indicators:  i)  localisation  of 
innovative  activities;  ii)  size  of  innovative  firms;  iii)  permanence  in  the  hierarchy  of 
innovators; iv) new entry of innovators.  
The  Schumpeter  Mark  I  pattern  (SMI),  defined  a  creative  destruction  regime,  shows  low 
concentration  of  innovative  activities  at  the  firm  level,  instability  in  the  hierarchy  of 
innovators and higher new entry of small business in innovation activities. Within this context 
knowledge  spillovers  among  firms  are  relevant  and  the  cumulative  process  regarding  the 
knowledge that supports innovation occurs at the territorial level and not at the firm level. The 
traditional low-tech branches (food industry; textile, wear and footwear; wood and furniture; 
non metallic mineral products and metallic products) are highly correlated to this pattern. 
Conversely,  Schumpeter  Mark  II  (SMII)  defining  the  creative  accumulation  regime  is 
reported in the same empirical analysis as the pattern where the concentration of innovative   7 
activities  involves  large    corporations;  the  latter  show  permanence  at  the  top  of  the 
innovators’ classification and are eventually less threatened by new innovators. In this case, 
the  accumulation  of  knowledge,  which  is  more  codified  in  nature,  is  supported  by  R&D 
investments and basically occurs at the firm level. Of course, there is a good correspondance 
between these sectors and the so-called hi-tech industries (machinery, electrical equipment, 
television, office machinery, medical components, motor vehicles, transport equipment). 
The Regional System of Innovation (RIS) concept is developed within the theoretical context 
of the National System of Innovation (NIS), where parallel technological changes in work 
organization and production are accompanied by cultural changes or changes in habits and 
routines (Lundvall, 1993; Cooke et al.,1997; Asheim and Coenen, 2005). The shift from NIS 
to RIS concerns the extent of the systemic character of the geographical and administrative 
space considered, as well as the territorial ray of the knowledge spillover. If the tacit character 
of knowledge is recognized as playing a key role in innovation, the latter cannot be easily 
shared  and  applied  outside  from  its  territory  of  generation  (Amin  and  Wilkinson,  1999; 
Antonelli, 2005). This geographical stickiness of knowledge diffusion and learning process is 
only one of the main characteristics of RIS. Within the latter, firms, other economic agents 
and local institutions co-evolve and contribute to shaping a specific political-administrative 
body. So RIS becomes an institutional repository of a certain negotiated, evolving, social 
order, that establishes routines, norms and values by which actors may come to trust each 
other collectively (Cooke et al.,1997). Different institutional settings will be likely to give rise 
to distinctive conventions or forms of collective social order, leading to the establishment of 
different kinds of organization of innovative activities, but also favouring different micro-
constitutional regulations that affect the labour market. 
Within  this  conceptual  framework,  the  hypothesis  regarding  the  endogenous  relationship 
between  numerical  flexibility  (or  labour  mobility)  and  innovative  activity,  can  be   8 
differentiated.  The  numerical  flexibility  of  the  labour  market  can  affect  the  innovative 
activities of industries and/or of regions in different ways.  
In hi-tech and SMII industries, where most of the science based and scale intensive sectors are 
covered, it is expected that lower job turnover does not hinder the generation of innovation 
and/or its adoption. Knowledge accumulation at the firm level generates a strong incentive to 
using the firm’s internal labour market (functional flexibility). The tenure of workforce allows 
not only a simple “learning by doing” process within the firm, but also guarantees a possible 
co-evolution among tangible assets, the firm’s core competences and the workers’ skills
3.  
On the other hand, high turnover rates provide support for the flow of knowledge across 
firms, within low-tech and SMI industries. The local production systems literature highlights 
that small and medium sized firm sectors benefit from the dynamic labour market where 
skilled workers very often change their workplace (Belussi, 1999). 
The  different  systems  of  governance  acting  at  the  regional  level  and  stemming  from  the 
evolution of different socio-economical development patterns (Papagni, 1995; Cooke et al., 
1997) could also affect the joint behaviour of labour flexibility and innovative activities. For 
example, aside from technological regimes of a particular industry, higher labour flexibility 
could exert a different impact in regions of the South of Italy, where the problem of the 
adjustement of wages and mobility of labour is deemed to be more severe with respect to the 
North of Italy (Faini, 1997). 
These  arguments  provide  a  first  theoretical  framework  to  carry  out  an  empirical  analysis 
where  some  aspects  of  labour  flexibility  and  innovative  activities  are  detected,  paying 
attention to both the specific character of the technology underlying the different industries 
and the territorial features. Prior to presenting the econometric specification, a more detailed 
discussion on the source of data and the meaning of variables has been carried out. 
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3. Data sources and variables  
 
The Dynamic Panel Data Model that will be presented in the following section concerns the 
manufacturing sectors of Italian industry, taken at the regional level over the period 1990-
1996
4. The relevance of the regional level has been discussed in the previous section. 
As far as the variables are concerned, we chose as dependent variable patent per capita, that 
describes innovative activities that have occurred within a specific regional sector of industry. 
Patents are a measure of the innovative output and are quite “popular” among innovation 
scholars, even though they are not inconvenient free (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000; Jacobsson 
and Philipson, 1996; Griliches, 1990). For example, the propensity to patent can vary across 
sectors  and  products  (or  production  processess),  according  to  institutional  and  structural 
characteristics  concerning  the  appropriability  of  innovations  (Malerba  and  Torrisi,  2000). 
These characteristics contribute to making the specific technological regime of the sectors, but 
at the same time, could severely bias the relationships to be examined. As will be discuss in 
section 4, the Arellano Bond estimator allows us to control this different propensity to patent 
across sectors. 
However, it is worth noting that with respect to other indicators, such as R&D expenditures, 
patents often account for informal technological activity, evaluating the amount of innovative 
activity  of  medium  and  small  firms  (Malerba  and  Torrisi,  2000;  Ferrari  et  al.,  2002). 
Moreover, patent data used in the present analysis come from the CRENOS databank and 
refer  to  European  Patent  Office  (EPO)  applications.  This  indicator  should  be  particularly 
effective  in  taking  into  account  potentially  high  remunerative  innovations,  which  for  this 
reason are patented abroad (Paci and Usai, 2000). Finally these patent data, initially classified 
by  means  of  the  International  Patent  Classifications  (IPC)
5,  have  been  converted  to  the 
manufacturing  industry,  thanks  to  the  Yale  Technology  Concordance,  in  order  to  obtain 
coherent data with the ATECO91 classification (Paci and Usai, 2000).   10 
As far as the numerical flexibility of the labour market is concerned, we chose the gross job 
turnover rate.  
Actually, there is little agreement on using gross job turnover (or job reallocation) as a proxy 
for numerical flexibility, i.e. less hiring and firing restrictions (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997; 
Contini et al., 1996; Boeri, 1996; 1999). In comparative analyses between European countries 
and US, both Bertola and Rogerson (1997) and Boeri (1999) criticize the use of turnover rate 
to prove the negligible differences found in flexibility terms. Conversely, they claim that high 
wage compression (coming from collective bargaining) and high rigidity in hiring and firing 
the workforce, produce high European and Italian turnover rates without the presence of  real 
labour market flexibility. We try to take into account this objection, by introducing wage 
levels as explanatory variables. 
Job turnover also depends on the business cycle (Schivardi 1998). We have taken into account 
this relationship by carrying out correlation analysis between this variable and yearly growth 
rate of sectoral GDP
6. The lack of correlation confirms the result found by Boeri (1996) for 
Western European labour markets, where gross job turnover is basically acyclical.  
In line with the aforementioned literature, we refer to gross job turnover as the sum of job 
creation and job destruction occurred at the firm level and measured by means of surveys 
realized  by  the  National  Institution  of  Social  Security  databank  (NISS),  that  identify  the 
movement of employment positions across firms.  
More  precisely,  the  average  job  creation  occurring  in  regional  sector  is 
( )
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where  1 , , , , , , − − t j i f t j i f E E  is the positive difference between jobs registered in firm f, belonging 
to region j and sector i, over the yearly period (t and t-1); 
2 / ) ( 1 , , , , − + t j i t j i N N  is the average number of firms belonging to region j and sector i, in which 
the growth of  jobs occurred.   11 
In the same way, the average job destruction of the regional sector is 
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where  1 , , , , , , − − t j i f t j i f E E   is  the  negative  difference,  taken  in  absolute  value,  between  jobs 
registered in firm f, belonging to region j and sector i, over the yearly period (t and t-1). 
Thus, the average gross job turnover in region j and sector i, is  simply  
j i j i j i D C GJT , , , + =                 (3) 
Also wage levels have been drawn from NISS databank. This source allows us to differentiate 
between  the  wages  of  white  and  blue  collars.  Since,  the  white  collar  category  includes 
researchers and other high-skilled workers, we can assess whether the efficiency wage effect 
is concentrated or not in these different worker groups. 
In  order  to  differentiate  the  territorial  context  corresponding  to  different  models  of 
industrialization we use, as interaction dummies, the classical five geographical macro-areas 
(North-West, North-East, Centre, South and the Islands). Moreover, the technological context 
is controlled by relying on the different intensity of R&D investment in the economic sectors, 
normalized by the respective GDP. The OECD classification is used to identify hi-tech/low-
tech industries (Hatzichrnoglou, 1997)
7. This international classification corresponds to the 
Italian  classification  of  the  R&D  intensity  reported  by  ISTAT  (2001)  in  the  Community 
Innovation Survey. The hi-tech/low-tech industries are considered proxies with respect to the 
SMII and SMI technological regimes, given the high correlation between the two categories 
(Pieroni and Pompei, 2003). 
The ten industries, classified according to R&D intensity, are displayed in Table 1. In Table 2 
some descriptive statistics on patents and labour market indicators are reported. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE   12 
An overall higher variability can be observed in the industry profiles of table 2. As far as the 
patent  activities  are  concerned,  this  finding  stems  from  the  different  appropriability 
conditions, which means that technological regimes matter.  
The level of patent activities in some low-tech industries is not completely negligible: for 
example 3.18 patents per million of inhabitants in the wood and furniture sector, and 3.27 in 
the metal products sector are levels comparable with a high-tech sector such as that of motor 
vehicles (3.21). Indeed, during the nineties, there were four mature sectors (wood-furniture, 
textile, non metallic mineral products and metal products) in which Italy showed international 
specialisation  in  terms  of  patent  demand  (Ferrari  et  al.,  2002).  There  are  also  economic 
activities where the territorial location of the firms by means of industrial districts plays a key 
role. Taking into account this fact, we carried out an analysis restricted to these four sectors 
and tried to evaluate the influence of the presence of industrial districts in the innovation-
labour market relationship. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
In the 1990-1996 period, higher average turnover rates were found in hi-tech industries and 
they were probably the outcome of the severe reorganization processes that took place in 
these industries in those years. These processes were accompanied by high standard deviation, 
signalling  strong differences among regions.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that higher wage levels, mainly within the blue collar group, did 
not occur in the hi-tech sectors, although it did in some low-tech sectors. Finally, it is worth 
noting  the  geographical  concentration  reported  in  empirical  studies:    about  56%  of  the 
demands for patents is by firms situated in the Northern Italy (Ferrari et al., 2002).This fact 
underlines the importance of traditional historical factors that concern different models of 
industrialization.  
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4 Models and Estimations 
The hypothesis that the innovation activities of Italian firms are influenced by the wages or 
labour mobility indicators has been investigated econometrically. This idea was also widely 
supported by other micro-econometric works (Chennells and Van Reenen, 1997; Flaig and 
Stadler,  1994;  Mohnen  et  al.,1986),  suggesting  likely  endogeneity  between  wages  and 
innovations.  
The first step of the estimation strategy uses a two-way panel data approach. In the formal 
way, the static panel data specification takes the following structure: 
 
t i t i t i x y ,
'
, , µ β + =                 (4) 
where  t i y ,  is the dependent variable measuring the innovation activity, 
'
,t i x  is the 1 ×K vector 
of explanatory variables and β  is a K × 1 vector. We have assumed that the error t i, µ  follows 
a two-way error component model: 
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In particular i µ denotes the individual-specific residual differing across sectors but constant 
for a given case, while  t λ  year-period effects is assumed to be fixed parameters estimated as 
coefficients  of  time  dummies  for  each  year  in  the  sample.  This  can  be  justified  by 
macroeconomic cyclical fluctuations concerning the down-turn in the 1990-1996 period.  
In  order  to  measure  the  relationships  between  innovation  activity  and  labour  market 
indicators,  two  facts  should  be  considered.  Firstly,  innovation  processes  are  generally 
characterized by cumulative effects; thus, it is interesting to specify and test the existence of 
persistent behaviours in the innovation process by a dynamic econometric model. Secondly,   14 
the  innovation  process  could  depend  on  some  relevant  explicative  variables  that  are  not 
strictly exogenous, such that the unidirectional causality relationship could be questionable.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) gave an answer to the first problem developing a difference GMM 
estimator that treats model (4) as a system of dynamic equations, one for each time period, in 
which the equations differ only in their instrument, moment condition sets and endogeneity 
problems. The following equation describes the dynamic specification: 




, 2 , 1 , , − − − − − + − + − = ∆ t i t i t i t i t i t i t i x x y y y ν ν β ϑ     (6) 
Since  t i y , is a function of  i µ , the lagged dependent variable  1 , − t i y  is also a function of  i µ . 
Hence,  1 , − t i y , a right-hand regressor in (6), is correlated with the error term, leading the OLS 
estimator to be biased and inconsistent. Moreover, the fixed effect estimator is biased and 
potentially  inconsistent  even  if  t i, ν   is  serially  uncorrelated,  since  1 , − t i y   is  correlated  with 
residuals (Baltagi, 2001).  
Finally, the transformed equation (6) uses instrumental variables to estimate parameters
8 in a 
GMM framework in order to obtain consistent estimates if there is no second order serial 
correlation among errors. In particular, the assumption that the idiosyncratic error term in 
equation  levels  is  not  autocorrelated  has  two  testable  implications  in  the  first-differenced 
equation: disturbances will exhibit negative and significant first-order serial correlations and 
zero second- or higher -order serial correlations.  
In the Arellano-Bond estimator, Sargan’s test for over-identifying restrictions and a robust 
version of the first step of the Arellano-Bond estimation are included to verify the adequacy 
of  the  model  specification  and  the  statistically  robustness  of  estimated  parameters  for 
inference. 
The benchmark specification, used to estimate the dynamic relationship between innovation 
activity and the labour market and written for simplicity in levels, is: 
   15 
  t i t i t i t i x y y ,
'
, 1 , , µ β θ + + = −          (7) 
where  t i, µ  follows, as in equation (5), a two-way error component model. Again,  i µ denotes 
the  individual-specific  residual,  differing  across  cases  but  constant  for  a  given  case.  For 
instance, a sector with a major propensity to patent is likely to have large innovations year 
after year and hence have a large  i µ . 
The variable  t i y , denotes the value of innovation activity at time t (with t = 0, . . . , 7), 
belonging  to  the  sectoral  group  i
9.  According  to  the  conceptual  framework  explained  in 
section 2, we expect to find some statistically significant relationships among explanatory 
variables of job turnover and wage level in the innovation activity. 
Given that we emphasized a plurality of hypotheses, the expected signs do not converge upon 
specific conjectures. 
As far as turnover is concerned, the explorative nature of the analysis leads us to suppose that 
an overall negative sign could support the predictions of Acemoglu’s model (1997a), in which 
the  high  mobility  of  labour  hinders  respectively  the  innovation  investments  of  firms  and 
human  capital  investments  of  workers.  Conversely,  if  the  result  appears  not  statistically 
significant, a technological or geographical differentiation is needed in order to explore the 
same  hypoteses  in  different  contexts.  In  the  context  of  the  technological  regime 
differentiation, we expect that a higher turnover rate affects negatively the innovative activity 
of  the  hi-tech  sectors  (identified  with  SMII  technological  regime),  where  knowledge  and 
competences accumulate at firm level and the firms benefit from the tenure of the workforce. 
The opposite should happen in low-tech sectors (identified with SMI technological regime), 
where the creative destruction Schumpeterian pattern holds. 
After a geographical differentiation, we expect the prediction of Acemoglu’s model  to be 
confirmed in the macro-area where innovative  activities are more concentrated, that is in 
Northern of Italy.   16 
Overall statistically significant wage levels are  expected with positive signs, according to 
efficiency wages theory.   
 The explanatory variables on the right hand side of (7), also include one immediate lag of the 
value  of  innovation  activity.  Since  the  data  are  a  collection  of  sectoral  information,  the 
dynamic components control the cumulative effects of innovation activities within regional 
sectors. In this case we do not have an a priori idea concerning the expected sign of these 
effects. Moreover, given the two-way error components, calendar year dummies are included 
in the estimation to control for macroeconomic impulses. 
In some cases the assumption of strict exogeneity of the explicative variables is not assertable 
since the variables could be predetermined or endogeneous, leading to a mis-specification of 
the true relationship. For this reason, in order to obtain the best rationale for data, we specify 
wage  levels  (both  for  white  and  blue  collars)  as  a  predetermined  variable,  including  the 
possibility that the unforecastable errors in the innovation activity (at time t) might affect 
future changes in wage levels. The literature suggested the possibility of a causal relationship 
between  innovations  and  job  turnover,  questionable  if  we  consider  an  economy  with 
endogenous  technology  choice  (Acemoglu,  1997a).  In  the  empirical  part  we  assess 
endogenous  behaviours  of  the  job  turnover  statistically,  non-rejecting  its  endogenous 
specifications to depict the circular causality. From an econometric point of view, we remark 
that lagged levels of endogenous variables are available to serve as instruments, while the 
different  characterization  of  the  job  turnover  and  wage  levels  as  endogenous  and 
predetermined  variables,  respectively,  reducing  the  problem  linked  with  the  likely 
multicollinearity  problem  when  the  same  labour  market  indicators  are  considered  as 
exogenous. 
The specification in equation (7) is used as a maintained hypothesis with the job turnover 
variable included as an endogenous variable and wage levels as a predetermined variable, also   17 
when we distinguish between hi-tech from low-tech technological intensity levels and macro-
geographical areas.  
Finally, to evaluate different impacts on innovations when the statistical parameters of labour 
market indicators are not significant, interaction dummies are included in equation (7) aiming 
to restrict the set of observations. 
 
5. Results 
The  importance  of  time  effects,  remarked  by  the  statistical  significance  of  time-dummy 
parameters  in  the  static  specification  in  equation  (4),  both  when  white  and  blue  collar 
indicators are inserted as exogenous labour market variables, stresses the need for a dynamic 
specification
10. 
As previously mentioned, serial correlation as well as the presence of endogeneity among 
labour market indicators and innovation activity is solved taking into account dynamically 
specified models, including lagged variables on the right side of the equation. Estimation of 
the  baseline  specification  of  equation  (7)  by  the  Arellano  and  Bond  estimator  (1991)  is 
displayed in Table 3.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
The two columns report estimations separately by different groups of workers using a mix of 
statistics for one-step and two-step estimations when we have heteroscedasticity in the data. 
Thus,  the  two-step  Arellano-Bond  estimator  is  implemented  to  evaluate  the  validity  of 
instruments by the Sargan test since, in a one-step framework, the test is over-rejected. An 
overall  significant  dynamic  specification  of  the  model  is  supported  by  the  p-value  of  the 
Sargan  test  (0.60  and  0.54  respectively)  non-rejecting  the  included  instruments.  On  the 
contrary, one-step estimations, corrected for heteroscedasticity, are used for inference on the 
coefficients and for testing autocorrelation higher than first-order. Thus, the null hypothesis of 
the first-order no-autocorrelation is rejected at the usual five percent level, while second-order   18 
no-autocorrelation  is  not  rejected,  confirming  the  validity  of  the  dynamic  panel  data 
specification (Arellano and Bond, 1991).  
The estimated parameters in column 1 of Table 3 suggest that only blue collar wages have a 
meaningful impact on patent performances of economic sectors, taken at regional level. More 
precisely, the higher wages of blue collars seem to improve innovative activities, whereas 
neither job turnover nor the cumulative effect of technology (the lagged dependent variable) 
play a role in this general specification. In the second column, when we replace blue collar 
wage levels with the white collar ones, the same result holds; we remark that the positive 
impact on innovative activities of the latter is slightly less stressed. Moreover, the significant 
influence of temporal dummies, with negative sign, underlines the role played by cyclical 
fluctuations. Probably the downturn period that has characterised the Italian business cycle, 
negatively  affected  R&D  investment  levels  complementary  to  researchers  and  other  high-
skilled workers, included in the white collars group
11. 
In  Table  4,  an  interaction  dummy  has  been  included  in  the  model,  in  order  to  test  the 
sensitivity of job turnover to the geographical differentiation.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Once  again,  both  the  first  and  second  autocorrelation  tests  are  coherent  with  a  dynamic 
specification of the panel data in each equation reported below, as well as Sargan tests. In 
column 1, where the specification includes blue collar wages as the predetermined variable, 
job turnover exerts a significant and negative impact in the North-West and North-East of the 
country. Conversely, the same geographical interaction dummies lack statistical significance 
when we replace white collar wages with the blue collar ones (column 2). The significance of 
the results obtained for parameters in North-West and North-East regions is increased by the 
estimation of the equation in column 3 with a sample restricted to these areas. As expected, 
the conditional estimation shows a negative and statistically significant  parameter for job 
turnover, while the robustness of the blue collars parameter is remarkable with respect to the   19 
unconditional estimation of column 1 (column 3). As mentioned in section 3, in these areas 
the majority of patent demands is localized. Therefore this finding is not negligible and seems 
to support the insights of recent views summarized in Acemoglu (1997a), in which higher 
mobility costs or uncertainty about the tenure of job relations negatively affect the innovation 
activities.  
The  impact  of  job  turnover  on  innovation  activities  is  not  clarified  by  technological 
differentiation of industries (Table 5).  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
The remarkable outcome of these estimations is the different behaviour of wages of each 
category  of  workers.  In  hi-tech  industries  only  the  blue  collar  wage  levels  influence 
innovative activities, acting as a sort of binding factor (column 2). Probably in this context the 
problem was not the lack of research, but the following set-up of the product or process to 
patent, carried out by qualified blue collars. Conversely in low-tech sectors the pecuniary 
incentive  for  white  collars  was  the  real  binding  factor  (column  4),  as  signalled  by  the 
significance of the positive coefficient of this category. Statistically, almost all specification 
tests are significant. Only the Sargan test in Low-Tech industries, where blue collar wages are 
considered as the predetermined variable (column 3), could be questionable (p-value=0.0785). 
However, since the p-value is greater than the usual critical value we accept valid instruments 
in the estimation.  
The  last  estimation  results  concern  four  mature  sectors  (textile,  wood  and  furniture,  non 
metallic mineral products and metal products) quoted both for relevant contributions to the 
technological specialisation in patent terms and for the plentiful supply of qualified workers 
(Ferrari  et  al.,  2002).  The  patent  stock  and  flows  obtained  in  these  branches  have  been 
relevant in Italy compared with other OECD countries and have contributed to the persistence 
of  technological  specialisation  in  low-tech  sectors.  Within  this  context  we  have  explored 
labour market-innovation relationships differentiating between the presence (or absence) of   20 
industrial districts in at least one of the four sectors, taken at the regional level. The results are 
illustrated in Table 6. Firstly, we can observe that job turnover is neither sensitive to particular 
low-tech sectors nor significant to district effects, as shown by non-significant values of the 
respective coefficients. Moreover, in the sample characterized by regions that include districts 
(column 2), it is worth noting the statistical significance of the lagged innovation variable, as 
well as the positive impact of white collar wages. According to the previous result concerning 
low-tech sectors, only the latter exert a positive impact on patents. However, the parameter 
size signals that in the industrial districts relative to the four sectors, white collar wages play a 
more important role than the whole low-tech sector group. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Finally the negative impact of lagged dependent variable means that patent activities follow 




In  this  paper  we  have  investigated  the  impact  of  labour  market  indicators  on  innovative 
activities of Italian industrial sectors for the 1990-1996 period. Dynamic specifications of this 
relationship have been tested in order to  account for both the presence of the innovation 
cumulative effects and the likely endogeneity of labour market indicators with innovation. 
Moreover, models including specific technological regimes of innovations and geographical 
areas are introduced to evaluate the likely differentiation of the relationship over these two 
dimensions. 
The best dynamic specifications that rationalise data include wage levels as a predetermined 
variable and job turnover as an endogenous variable. The empirical tests confirm the circular 
causality discussed in the first part of the paper and it make the unidirectional causal link 
between labour market indicator and innovation questionable.   21 
The results show that wage levels have a significant role in improving innovation activities. 
Therefore, higher wages, both in blue and white collars, stimulate the present patent activity 
but they are, in turn, favoured by past innovative output. This result confirms in some way the 
efficiency  wages  theory,  at  least  as  far  as  the  determinants  of  innovation  activities  are 
concerned. Moreover, it is important to note the cross significance of wages for different 
worker categories, when a technological regime separation is carried out. Only blue collar 
wages exert a positive impact on the patent demands of hi-tech sectors, while white collar 
wages have a significant impact on low-tech sectors. In this context, a couple of binding 
factors seem to show the complementarity between different forms of knowledge that support 
innovation. The tacit knowledge accumulation of qualified blue collars, stimulated by higher 
wages, is probably crucial to develop the innovative ideas created by researchers in hi-tech 
firms.  Conversely  incentives  to  favour  the  creative  participation  of  white  collars  (i.e. 
researchers, but also executive cadres that improve organizational aspects) are determinant in 
low-tech firms. 
The gross job turnover, taken as indicator of labour market flexibility, has not shown an 
overall  statistical  significance.  Nonetheless  the  result  obtained  through  the  geographic 
differentiation  is  not  negligible:  in  regions  where  patent  activity  is  more  significant  (the 
North-West  and  North-East  of  the  country),  labour  mobility  exerts  a  negative  impact  on 
innovation, whereas the impact the of the higher blue collar wages is positive. According to  
recent views that extend the job-search theory, when a negative impact on the innovative 
activity occurs the high mobility of labour could affect either technology investments within 
the firm or human capital investments carried out by workers before being hired. 
Finally, in the four “Made in Italy” sectors (textile, wood and furniture, non metallic mineral 
products and metal products) a significant relationship holds only in the industrial districts 
areas. In this context job turnover does not have a significant role while, according to the 
result obtained in low-tech sectors, only white collar wages have a significant and positive   22 
influence. A notable finding of this case is the non cumulative character of patent activities, 
underlined  by  the  significant  and  negative  impact  of  the  lagged  dependent  variable.  A 
reasonable  explanation  for  this  kind  of  innovation  activity,  apparently  contrasting  the 
persistent  technological  specialisation  displayed  at  the  national  level,  is  depicted  by  the 
Schumpeterian creative destruction process, occurring at the industrial districts level. In other 
terms  the  negative  influence  of  past  patent  activity  seems  to  disclose  a  case  of  strong 
concurrence in innovation activities among the industrial districts of “Made in Italy” sectors.   23 
Footnotes 
1 A review on this argument is presented by Acemoglu (2002). 
2 Actually this choice is quite questionable. As we will discuss in the next section, labour 
mobility is often the result of an ambiguous proxy of labour market regulation. In any case 
there  is  no  accordance  around  this  point  and  the  debate  is  still  open.  We  consider  this 
question a technical problem, related to the selection of indicators describing labour market 
flexibility, whereas the crucial point faced in this section concerns the consistency of the 
basic idea relying on the multidimensional character of the labour flexibility-innovation 
relationship.  
3 The crucial role played by the co-evolution of tangibile (capital, natural resources, etc.) and 
intangible (competencies, reputation, etc.) resources within corporations is examined by the 
resource-based view and other fields of strategic management theory (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece, 2000).  
4Technical problem faced by the National Institution of Social Security in updating and 
releasing the specific data on the labour market used in this study, constrained us to limit 
our analysis at this period. 
5A system that categorizes invention by product or process. 
6 The result of our correlation analysis are available upon request to the authors. Howewer we 
considered the overall impact of the business cycle upon innovation-labour market 
relationship by introducing temporal dummies in the econometric specification. 
7 More precisely, we redefined only 2 classes, aggregating high and medium-high technology 
sectors in hi-tech and low and medium-low technology sectors in low-tech. 
8 It is known that valid instruments are  2 , − t i y  and lagged values of 
'
,t i x . 
9 Obviously, the sectors are taken at the regional level.   24 
10 In order to save space, the results of static model (4) are not reported. The estimated results, 
the full data set and the program carried out with package STATA 8, are available upon 
request to the authors.  
11 We could not control directly for R&D investment by including them in the right side of 
econometric  specification,  because  of  the  lack  of  a  suitable  breakdown  of  R&D  data, 
involving  both  a  sectoral  and  regional  profile.  For  this  reason  we  think  that  temporal 
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TABLES 
 




  HI-TECH  LOW-TECH 
Food, beverages and tabacco     
Textile products, Wear industry, Leather industry; Luggage, 
handbags and footwear     
Wood, Forniture and other manufacturing     
Paper, printing and publishing     
Coke and refined petroleum products, Chemical products and 
synthetic fibres, Plastic products     
Non metallic mineral products     
Fabricated and structural metal products     
Machinery, electrical equipment, television, office machinery, 
Medical components and Instruments for measuring     
Motor vehicles, Transport equipment     
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Table 2 - Summary statistics by industry (average 1990-1996) 
   Patents per million Inhabitants  Turnover 
   Sum  Dvst  Min  Max  Mean  Dvst  Min  Max 
Food, beverages and tabacco  0.36  0.03  0.00  0.21  4.45  0.70  3.49  6.92 
Textile products, Wear industry, 
Leather industry; Luggage, 
handbags and footwear 
1.24  0.10  0.00  0.52  5.61  0.90  3.48  9.96 
Wood, Forniture and other 
manufacturing  3.18  0.17  0.00  0.61  4.76  1.94  3.41  25.13 
Paper, printing and publishing  0.62  0.04  0.00  0.19  4.51  0.70  2.53  6.31 
Coke and refined petroleum 
products, Chemical products 
and synthetic fibres, Plastic 
products 
11.03  0.66  0.00  3.10  7.29  2.12  4.47  14.52 
Non metallic mineral products  0.68  0.04  0.00  0.32  5.41  1.04  3.58  10.15 
Fabricated and structural metal 
products  3.27  0.18  0.00  0.60  5.75  1.47  3.94  11.71 
Machinery, electrical 
equipment, television, office 
machinery, Medical components 
and Instruments for measuring 
32.15  1.74  0.00  6.27  6.35  1.51  3.75  13.79 
Motor vehicles, Transport 
equipment  3.21  0.25  0.00  1.38  14.97  17.92  2.00  121.67 
Building  0.12  0.01  0.00  0.04  5.33  0.84  3.55  7.52 
   Blue collar wages  White collar wages 
   Mean  Dvst  Min  Max  Mean  Dvst  Min  Max 
Food, beverages and tabacco  28506  2890  22720  34663  35011  5231  25088  47479 
Textile products, Wear industry, 
Leather industry; Luggage, 
handbags and footwear 
23240  2271  18959  28060  27767  6243  16176  41131 
Wood, Forniture and other 
manufacturing  24757  2317  19751  29143  30604  3873  22116  38461 
Paper, printing and publishing  27375  3113  21509  36566  32078  5036  19809  44581 
Coke and refined petroleum 
products, Chemical products 
and synthetic fibres, Plastic 
products 
24964  2652  15832  30302  32534  4230  24601  46942 
Non metallic mineral products  27804  2738  22059  34099  34027  4581  24636  47990 
Fabricated and structural metal 
products  28005  3155  22324  34485  33788  5701  23314  46046 
Machinery, electrical 
equipment, television, office 
machinery, Medical components 
and Instruments for measuring 
25421  3085  19007  34004  32306  4508  23422  45972 
Motor vehicles, Transport 
equipment  26771  3333  12896  33657  30915  8248  7829  45987 






















Dependent Variable: Patents  (1)  (2) 
      Patents (t-1)  -0.1828*  -0.1944 
  (-1.18)  (-1.21) 
Turnover  0.0007  0.0008 
  (0.61)  (0.72) 
Blue collars wages  0.0161   
  (2.42)   
White collar wages    0.0004 
    (2.41) 
Time Dummy 1993  -0.0418  -0.0427 
  (-2.80)  (-2.91) 
Time Dummy 1994  -0.0494  -0.0665 
  (-1.78)  (-2.40) 
Time Dummy 1995  -0.0601  -0.0799 
  (-1.43)  (-1.93) 
Time Dummy 1996  -0.1038  -0.1255 
  (-1.93)  (-2.38) 
Constant  0.0066  0.0177 
  (0.47)  (1.50) 
Arellano Bond test Ho: non- 





Arellano Bond test Ho: non- 






2)  (0.6009)  (0.5432) 
*z value in brackets       33 




































          Patents (t-1)  -0.1833*  -0.1954  -0.0486 
  (-1.19)  (-1.22)  (-0.43) 
Turnover  0.0002  0.0022  -0.0029 
  (0.24)  (0.85)  (-1.94) 
Blue collars wages  0.0172    0.0435 
  (2.48)    (2.89) 
White collar wages    0.0051   
    (2.84)   
NorthWest*turnover  -0.0021  -0.0036   
  (-2.46)  -(1.42)   
NorthEast*turnover  -0.0020  -0.0037   
  (-2.17)  (-1.37)   
Centre*turnover  0.0349  0.0025   
  (0.36)  (0.25)   
South*turnover  0.000001  -0.0034   
  (0.00)  -(1.11)   
Time Dummy 1993  -0.0425  -0.0438  -0.0713 
  (-2.79)  (-2.94)  (-2.32) 
Time Dummy 1994  -0.0466  -0.0649  -0.0980 
  (-1.69)  (-2.36)  (-1.57) 
Time Dummy 1995  -0.0601  -0.0812  -0.1075 
  (-1.43)  (-1.96)  (-1.12) 
Time Dummy 1996  -0.1032  -0.1253  -0.2482 
  (-1.90)  (-2.36)  (-2.02) 
Constant  0.0056  0.0169  -0.0012 
  (0.40)  (1.44)  (-0.04) 
Arellano Bond test Ho: non- 







Arellano Bond test Ho: non- 








2)  (0.6194)  (0.6008)  (0.2222) 
*z value in brackets         34 
 
 
      Table 5 - Estimation by technological intensity of industries 
 
  Hi-Tech sectors  Low-Tech sectors 
Dependent Variable: Patents  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
          Patents (t-1)  -0.8761  -0.1250  -0.097  -0.1167 
  (-0.65)  (-0.83)  (-1.08)  (-1.39) 
Turnover  -0.0001  0.0006  -0.0021  -0.0004 
  (-0.10)  (0.58)  (-0.45)  (-0.11) 
Blue collars wages  0.0232    0.0123   
  (2.51)    (1.59)   
White collar wages    0.0004    0.0003 
    (1.18)    (2.19) 
Time Dummy 1993  -0.1482  -0.1320  -0.0086  -0.0115 
  (-2.65)  (-2.60)  (-1.12)  (-1.71) 
Time Dummy 1994  -0.1779  -0.2001  -0.0028  -0.1506 
  (-1.96)  (-2.17)  (-0.27)  (-1.75) 
Time Dummy 1995  -0.2561  -0.2718  0.0061  -0.0093 
  (-1.89)  (-1.98)  (0.39)  (-0.85) 
Time Dummy 1996  -0.4006  -0.4128  -0.0019  -0.0189 
  (-2.34)  (-2.43)  (-0.09)  (-1.19) 
Constant  0.06413  0.0766  -0.0114  -0.0026 
  (1.77)  (2.12)  (-1.08)  (-0.57) 
Arellano Bond test Ho: non- 









Arellano Bond test Ho: non- 










2)  (0.2354)  (0.4070)  (0.0785)  (0.5179) 
*z value in brackets           35 
 
          
















  Regions with districts  Regions without districts 
Dependent Variable: Patents  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
          Patents (t-1)  -0.1282  -0.2091  -0.1625  -0.1294 
  (-1.72)  (-2.59)  (-1.33)  (-0.98) 
Turnover  -0.0054  -0.0028  -0.0013  0.0013 
  (-0.53)  (-0.33)  (1.15)  (0.97) 
Blue collars wages  -0.0004    0.0001   
  (-0.38)    (0.34)   
White collar wages    0.0006    0.0001 
    (2.42)    (0.50) 
Time Dummy 1993  -0.0310  -0.0312  0.1172  0.0116 
  (-2.00)  (-2.10)  (1.43)  (1.33) 
Time Dummy 1994  -0.0103  -0.0456  0.0056  0.0046 
  (-0.43)  (-2.25)  (0.60)  (0.48) 
Time Dummy 1995  0.0026  -0.0304  -0.0007  -0.0015 
  (-0.09)  (-1.21)  (-0.06)  (-0.11) 
Time Dummy 1996  -0.1592  -0.0457  -0.0015  -0.0022 
  (-0.41)  (-1.24)  (-0.08)  (-0.11) 
Constant  0.0089  -0.0873  0.00002  -0.0005 
  (0.62)  (-0.88)  (0.00)  (0.10) 
Arellano Bond test Ho: non- 










Arellano Bond test Ho: non- 










2)  (0.722)  (0.625)  (0.978)  (0.985) 
*z value in brackets         